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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991), the attached second semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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Annex

Second semi-annual report (covering the period 17 December 1991 - 17 June 1992) on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Introduction

By resolution 699 of 17 June 1991, the Security Council approved the plan submitted by the IAEA through the Secretary-General for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687. Resolution 699 also called for the Secretary-General to submit every six months a progress report on the implementation of the plan.

The first of these reports was circulated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Security Council in document S/23295 dated 17 December 1991. The Secretary-General also circulated on 29 May 1992 a report (S/24036) submitted by the Director General of the IAEA on the status of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 705 (1991). In this report, the Director General provided information related to destruction activities carried out in Iraq during the 11th inspection mission.

This is the second semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for destruction, removal or rendering harmless covering the period from 17 December 1991 to 17 June 1992. Its content has been structured in such a way as to facilitate comparison with the previous report and evaluation of progress.

Present situation

Direct-Use Material

Fresh fuel

After the removal of all the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor, which was accomplished in November 1991, in conjunction with the 8th IAEA inspection, the 12.24 kg of U235 contained in the fuel was processed in a Russian facility and transformed through isotopic dilution into approximately 61 kg of uranium enriched to slightly less than 20% in U235. Once the product specifications have been verified by the Agency, this material will be transferred from the processing plant to an agreed facility for storage in Russia. Agency safeguards will continue to be applied during storage.

The French-origin MTR type plates containing a total of 372 grams of U235, and the Russian-origin pins, containing a total of 116.1 grams of U235, were removed from Iraq in June 1992 by the inspectors of the 12th team and are now temporarily stored at laboratory of the IAEA in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Irradiated fuel

As referred to in the first report (S/23295), other irradiated enriched research reactor fuel containing a total of 35.58 kg of U235 is held in storage in two locations, one within Tuwaitha in the Russian reactor building, the second, at a site identified as Location B, a few kilometers north of Tuwaitha in farm land area.

Inadequate storage conditions at Location B led to serious corrosion problems. New containers were brought to this site and filled with demineralized water, into which all of the fuel elements in Location B were transferred with the exception of 6 control rods. The situation is now stable and the corrosion rate should decrease.

Negotiations with the consortium of commercial companies from France and the UK for the removal and reprocessing of this fuel have met with difficulties of a legal, technical and and financial nature. Efforts are being made to overcome these difficulties.

Plutonium and Other Nuclear Material

There is nothing further to report on plutonium. As to other nuclear material, the material balance is still not satisfactory. The IAEA is continuing efforts to reconcile discrepancies in the declarations.

Installations, equipment and other materials relevant to enriched uranium production

Information received from Governments of other States and, in particular, from the Government of Germany about the procurement by Iraq of large quantities of special materials and components needed in the manufacturing of gas centrifuges for the production of enriched uranium, was used in the course of the 9th IAEA inspection mission. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged the procurement of these materials and components, but stated that all of them had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" before the start of inspection activities under UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991). In the course of the same mission, the Iraqi side acknowledged the procurement of additional special material and components not included in the information previously received by the Agency from Iraq or others States. The Iraqi authorities stated that destruction of these materials and components had also

occurred prior to commencement of the inspection activities. A detailed description of the material and components in question is contained in document S/23505. The extent and effectiveness of the destruction carried out by the Iraqi authorities of these items is now under assessment by the Agency. Additional measures will be necessary, in some cases, to rule out any possibility of recovery.

The destruction of components specific to the Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) program, begun in the previous six month reporting period, continues. The destruction activities have included the removal to a nearby storage area of 51 return irons (30 tons each) from the alpha calutron pier at Tarmiya.

A plan for the dismantling of EMIS uranium enrichment production capabilities at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites was prepared and communicated to the Iraqi side on 15 May 1992. The plan included reduction of the electrical power delivery to both sites, removal of general utilities from buildings and destruction of eight key technical buildings. Implementation of this plan was begun, with full co-operation of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, in the course of the 12th IAEA inspection (26 May - 4 June 1992) and is presently more than 50% complete. Dismantling operations at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat will be completed by the time of the next inspection, scheduled to take place in July 1992, in the course of which the destruction of relevant buildings at these sites will also be completed.

Installations and equipment relevant to the weaponization activities

On 25 March 1992, following a series of meetings in Vienna between IAEA officials and an Iraqi technical delegation, a formal communication containing a list of buildings and equipment to be destroyed at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site was transmitted to the Iraqi authorities. The Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site had been identified by the IAEA as the main research centre where the IAEC intended to pursue its program for developing nuclear weapons. Eight buildings covering a surface of approximately 35 000 square meters, and 26 major equipment items, some consisting of several components, were destroyed under the supervision of Agency inspectors in the course of the 11th and 12th IAEA inspection missions. In the case of one additional item on the equipment list, essential components were removed to IAEA, Vienna.

The techniques employed for destruction included the use of explosive charges. A total of more than 6 tons of explosives were used. The large bunker at the Al Hatteen site was filled with concrete and scrap iron to prevent its further use (350 cubic meters of concrete were poured), as the use of explosives in this case was judged to be impractical. The bunker's high protective berm was levelled. Cutting torches were used to destroy the steel liner shell

of the internal explosion test chamber and to cut off reinforcing bars of the internal explosive test chamber and of the contained firing facility that was part of the physics building. The Iraqi side provided all the equipment, materials and manpower necessary for fulfilling the destruction plan under the supervision of the IAEA teams. Details of the buildings and equipment destroyed at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site are given in the inspection reports of IAEA-11 (doc S/23947) and IAEA-12 (in preparation).

Future Activities

The removal from Iraq of the remaining 35 kilograms of U235 contained in the irradiated fuel elements of the Tamuz 2 and IRT 5000 research reactors is one of the major tasks still pending. It is hoped that negotiations with the contractors can be brought to a successful conclusion and that the financial resources necessary for removal and processing of the irradiated fuel will be found.

The destruction of key buildings and installations at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat will be completed in the course of the next IAEA inspection in Iraq. Once this operation is finished, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, Tuwaitha and Al Atheer-Al Hatteen will not be equipped for undertaking activities proscribed under United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The verification of compliance by Iraq with the requirements of the resolution at these sites will rest on the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification.

Additional destruction, removal or rendering harmless may be necessary in the near term pending the result of ongoing sample analysis. In the long-term, as provided for in paragraph 31 of the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification, the inspection of any sites designated by the Special Commission or the IAEA in the course of implementation of that Plan may also give rise to the need for destruction, removal or rendering harmless not foreseen at this time.